Perhaps the most haunting of C. S. Lewis’s poems is a sixteen-line sonnet entitled “Reason.”  In it Lewis contrasts the cool clarity and strength of reason (symbolized by Athena, the “maid” of the poem) with the warm darkness and creativity of the imagination (Demeter, the earth-mother, in the poem).  The poem concludes,

 

            Oh who will reconcile in me both maid and mother,

            Who make in me a concord of the depth and height?

            Who make imagination’s dim exploring touch

            Ever report the same as intellectual sight?

            Then could I truly say, and not deceive,

            Then wholly say, that I BELIEVE.¹

 

The poem is haunting in part because it does not reveal if Lewis ever found the concord of depth and height he so earnestly sought.  If the poem was written before his conversion to Christianity in 1931, one could assume that a reconciliation was effected by that experience and that through it he was made able to “believe.”  The date and occasion of the poem, however, are not known, so one cannot assume that it was an early poem or that reason and imagination were reconciled through Christianity.  Indeed, reason and imagination appear in works throughout Lewis’s career, in varied relationships, but not unquestionably unified and harmonized until near its end.  The questions about reason and imagination raised by the poem clearly suggest that this is a very significant theme in Lewis, but equally clearly these questions can be answered only by a careful examination of Lewis’s works as a whole.

            This book examines the place of reason and imagination [< p. ix] in the thought of C. S. Lewis and shows that a shift, not in basic positions or theory but certainly in emphasis and practice, occurs, not at the time of his conversion but in the late 1940s or early 1950s.  Prior to that—in Mere Christianity and the Ransom trilogy, for example—Lewis relied heavily upon, or put his ultimate trust in, reason (the capacity for analysis, abstraction, logical deductions), with imagination (the image-making, fictionalizing, integrative power) playing a valued but limited supporting role.²   After that, Lewis’s confidence in imaginative methods increases, and imagination becomes the more striking feature of his work from 1950 on—in the Chronicles of Narnia, for example.  My purpose is to chart the changes briefly, account for them as fully as possible, and show that in some of his later works, such as Till We Have Faces and Letters to Malcolm, reason and imagination are, at last, reconciled and unified.

            Till We have Faces has a crucial place in the study.  Not only is it Lewis’s finest imaginative work, but it also explores the tension between reason and the imagination as a central theme.  Furthermore, Till We Have Faces is the culmination of efforts Lewis made in a number of works throughout his life to use similar images and imaginative structures to resolve that tension. One cannot fully understand or appreciate Lewis’s thought and work as a whole without a sound understanding of Till We Have Faces.  But Till We Have Faces is also the most difficult of Lewis’s works, one which constantly gives the sense that “something more is going on here than I am comprehending fully.”  Many readers who enjoy Lewis’s other apologetic and fictional works are perplexed and discouraged by Till We Have Faces.  Because of these difficulties, many readers are denied access to the motif which is the most helpful in pulling together the diverse threads of Lewis’s thought and work.

            I have, therefore, adopted a rather unusual structure for this book.  Chapters I-IX explore reason and imagination in Till We Have Faces, while walking through the story with the reader, providing aids for those who have difficulty with it:  making sure the plot line is clear, pointing out structures and figures which bring out meaning, and reflecting upon [< p. x] the issues and ideas which underlie each section.  This book is not designed to take the place of reading the work itself; rather, the two might well be read together—Chapter I of this book, then Chapters 1-2 of Till We Have Faces, then Chapter II of this book, and so on.  Upon completing the process—and I think this is important—one should reread Till We Have Faces consecutively, without the pauses and breaks the previous process entails, to get a sense of the continuity and flow of the story.  Chapters X-XIV revert to conventional essays.  With Till We Have Faces now as common background, they examine the use of reason and imagination in works that precede and follow it—particularly Dymer, The Pilgrim’s Regress, The Great Divorce, Surprised by Joy, and Letters to Malcolm—tracing in them myths and images which find their mature expression Till We Have Faces.

            In doing so, I want to assert the importance of considering Lewis’s works in historical and chronological context.  Robert H. Smith, in a recent study of Lewis, posited that “Lewis’s thought appeared almost full-blown in the earliest Christian writings that came from his pen.  With only a few exceptions one may refer to his early or late works alike for the explication of any given subject without risking significant wrenching of his meaning.”³  Smith here assumes what ought instead to be proved; and if one starts with this as an assumption, the evidence will of course seem to confirm it.  Combining early and late statements may not “wrench” Lewis’s meaning, but on a number of topics it can blur valuable distinctions and obscure changes in emphasis; and it fosters the tendency, in Lewis studies, to treat Lewis as an authority figure and concentrate on summarizing his positions on various topics.  If Lewis studies are to progress beyond this and to become increasingly precise and illuminating, it will be necessary to attend to chronology and to the specific context which generated particular works, as well as the general historical milieu in which Lewis’s thought developed.

            I have sought to describe and examine Lewis’s works objectively, pointing out strengths and weaknesses as needed.  [< p. xi]  But criticism can never be wholly objective—the very act of reading inevitably involves the reader’s assumptions and experiences, and this book surely reflects mine, often no doubt in ways and to extents I am unaware of. My goal, therefore, is not to convince readers of a particular hypothesis about change or growth in Lewis, but to offer an approach to Lewis which will encourage and enable others to reread his works more closely and attentively.  My approach will modify earlier readings and later readings will modify mine; our combined efforts should result in a fuller and more accurate understanding of Lewis and the value of his work.

 

 

            Quotations from Till We Have Faces are from the 1980 reprinting of the American paperback edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich); page numbers are cited parenthetically in the text.  The pagination of the edition is the same as that of the original American clothbound edition (New York:  Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1957) and an earlier paperback edition (Grand Rapids, Mich.:  Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966.)  On page 203 I have appended a table by which those using other editions can identify the chapter in which a cited passage appears and thus locate it quite easily.  Quotations from other works by Lewis are from the earliest published form, unless stated otherwise.  I have not included a bibliography; all published studies of Till We Have Faces known to me are mentioned in the notes. [< p. xii]